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ABSTRACT
The framework for safe drinking-water recommended by the WHO guidelines for drinking-water quality promotes 
a risk-based preventive management approach to ensure safety of drinking-water. Independent drinking-water 
surveillance is one of the core components of this framework and is an essential public health function. To be 
effective, drinking-water surveillance needs to be aligned with risk-based principles, including prioritization of 
monitoring parameters and surveillance efforts based on water safety plan outcomes. Risk-based drinking-water 
surveillance comprises an independent and periodic review of all aspects of drinking-water quality and public health 
safety in which water-quality monitoring, on-site inspections, hazard identification and risk and trend analysis are 
important components. Applying a risk-based approach in drinking-water surveillance helps countries to focus on 
the issues that are most important for the protection of public health and so maximizes the benefits that can accrue 
from limited resources.
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1Introduction
Introduction
The Protocol on Water and Health 
The Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 
Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Water Courses and International 
Lakes (United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe & WHO Regional Office for Europe, 
1999) has the objective of:
 … protect[ing] human health and well-
being, both individual and collective, 
within a framework of sustainable 
development, through improving water 
management, including the protection 
of water ecosystems, and by preventing, 
controlling and reducing water-related 
diseases (Article 1). 
The Protocol is the first international agreement 
of its kind, adopted specifically to attain 
an adequate supply of safe drinking-water 
and adequate sanitation for everyone and 
effectively protect water used as a source of 
drinking-water. 
The Protocol sets several requirements for 
surveillance of drinking-water. In particular, 
Parties to the Protocol shall:
• establish targets for the standards and 
levels of performance that need to be 
achieved or maintained for a high level of 
protection against water-related disease, 
including on the quality of drinking-water 
supplied, taking into account the WHO 
guidelines for drinking-water quality 
(Article 6, paragraph 2 (a));
• establish and maintain a legal and 
institutional framework for monitoring 
and enforcing standards for the quality of 
drinking-water (Article 6, paragraph 5 (c));
• collect and evaluate data on common 
indicators, including on the quality of the 
drinking-water supplied (Article 7); and 
• promote the operation of effective 
networks to monitor and assess the 
provision and quality of water-related 
services, and development of integrated 
information systems (Article 14 (h)).
WHO framework for safe drinking-
water
The framework for safe drinking-water rec- 
ommended by the WHO guidelines for 
drinking-water quality (WHO, 2017a) promotes 
a risk-based preventive management approach 
to ensure safety of drinking-water (Fig. 1). 
Independent drinking-water surveillance is one 
of the core components of this framework and 
is an essential public health function. To be 
effective, drinking-water surveillance needs to 
be aligned with risk-based principles, including 
prioritization of monitoring parameters and 
surveillance efforts based on water safety 
plan (WSP) outcomes. This requirement 
applies to both small and large water supplies, 
recognizing that there is a difference, usually 
due to available resources. The framework 
includes also the principle of setting health-
based targets. These can relate to reductions 
in the rate of a waterborne disease or the 
setting of drinking-water quality standards for 
chemical contaminants. Surveillance seeks, at 
least in part, to ensure that progress is being 
made in meeting these targets.
WHO has recommended a risk-based approach 
to standard-setting, particularly in resource-
limited countries (WHO, 2018). This approach 
helps to develop drinking-water quality 
standards appropriate to the circumstances 
in a country, focusing on the parameters 
that are of highest concern in the national 
context, to provide a basic set of norms that 
can be changed or expanded over time as 
circumstances allow. 
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While the requirements and framework for 
the risk-based approach specified in the WHO 
guidelines for drinking-water quality may be 
set out by national authorities, the individual 
water supplier and surveillance agency are 
responsible for determining the details of how 
this is implemented, adapting as necessary to 
the local circumstances of each supply. 
Drinking-water surveillance 
WHO (1976) defines surveillance as “the 
continuous and vigilant public health 
assessment and review of the safety and 
acceptability of drinking-water supplies”. 
Surveillance is the responsibility of national, 
subnational and/or local authorities. Drinking-
water surveillance involves more than just 
water-quality monitoring: it is the independent 
and periodic review of all aspects of drinking-
water quality and public health safety in 
which water-quality monitoring, on-site 
inspections, hazard identification and risk and 
trend analysis are important components. 
While it will include review of water suppliers’ 
monitoring records and an assessment of how 
well supplies are meeting the standards set 
in the country, both individually and overall, it 
should also include audits of how well water 
suppliers are implementing their WSPs and, 
where possible, assessment of waterborne 
disease in the population. The latter is a 
powerful tool for measuring progress against 
national and local health targets established 
by national authorities. 
Risk-based drinking-water surveillance 
is considered best practice within the 
framework for safe drinking-water (Fig. 1). It 
reflects a shift in focus from overreliance on 
compliance-testing of a predetermined list 
of water-quality parameters to promoting a 
proactive approach to identifying, controlling 
and monitoring critical risks in water supply. 
Applying a risk-based approach in drinking-
water surveillance helps countries to focus 
on the issues that are most important for the 
protection of public health and so maximizes 
the benefits that can accrue from limited 
resources.
Fig. 1. WHO framework for safe drinking-water 
Health-based targets
Measurable health, drinking-water quality or performance objectives that provide 
benchmarks for water suppliers and regulators to confirm the adequacy of water-supply 
systems or the need for improvement
Water safety plans
Comprehensive risk-assessment and risk-management approach that encompasses all 
steps in the drinking-water supply from catchment to consumer, which supports water 
suppliers with effective management to ensure the safety of the supply system
Independent surveillance
Periodic review, external from the water supplier, of all aspects of drinking-water quality 
and public health safety, including providing confirmation that water safety plans are 
effective and that health-based targets are met
Source: modified from WHO (2017a).
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What is this publication about?
Supporting countries in building effective 
systems for surveillance of drinking-water 
is a priority area of work under the Protocol 
on Water and Health. A regional meeting on 
effective approaches to drinking-water quality 
surveillance, held in Oslo, Norway in May 2015 
recognized the importance of, and need for, 
the application of risk-based approaches 
in standard-setting and surveillance (WHO 
Regional Office for Europe, 2015).
This publication provides a rationale for 
decision-makers to promote and support 
uptake of risk-based approaches in regulations 
and surveillance practice. It has been designed 
around six key messages that underlie the 
concept of risk-based approaches in drinking-
water surveillance and is supported by practical 
examples for illustration purposes. 
Using this concise format, the publication 
aims to support decision-makers, regulators 
and national and subnational professionals in 
the fields of public health, environment and 
water management to better understand 
and appreciate the added value of risk-based 
drinking-water surveillance and thereby 
strengthen surveillance systems for better 
protection of public health. 
The publication provides a strong rationale 
for the application of risk-based approaches 
to surveillance and the prioritization of 
surveillance efforts that consider local 
hazards and available resources. Risk-based 
surveillance is an important building block 
towards reaching global and regional policy 
commitments, such as United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goal 6 on clean 
water and sanitation and the Declaration of the 
Sixth Ministerial Conference on Environment 
and Health (Ostrava Declaration), which 
collectively call for the adoption of risk-based 
approaches in ensuring the provision of safely 
managed drinking-water for all that protects 
health and well-being.
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Overview of the key messages
Key message 1: Surveillance is a core public health function
Drinking-water surveillance is a fundamental activity for the 
continuing protection of public health through the delivery 
of safe drinking-water. 
Key message 2: Risk-based surveillance is a governmental  
 responsibility
It is a responsibility of the government to establish legal and 
regulatory requirements for implementation of risk-based 
drinking-water surveillance that adequately protects public 
health. 
Key message 3: Risk-based surveillance points at what needs  
 to be looked at
Risk-based drinking-water surveillance identifies the hazards 
that pose the greatest risks to the population and supports 
the development of appropriate and efficient monitoring 
programmes for individual supplies.
Key message 4: Microbiological drinking-water quality is a  
 key focus of risk-based surveillance
Identifying microbiological hazards and risks before they 
affect public health is an essential part of risk-based 
surveillance. 
Key message 5: Only monitor what is necessary
Monitoring of chemicals needs to be selective. Risk-based 
drinking-water surveillance directs water-quality monitoring 
towards the most important, relevant parameters for system 
performance and public health protection. 
Key message 6: Risk-based surveillance aids forward-thinking  
 and anticipation of change
Hazards and risks change over time. Surveillance agencies 
have an important supporting role in predicting, identifying 
and tracking long-term changes and associated risks for 
drinking-water supply.
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Key message 1:  
Surveillance is a core public health 
function
Drinking-water surveillance is a fundamental activity for the continuing 
protection of public health through the delivery of safe drinking-water. 
1  This publication uses the term pan-European region to refer to the Member States of the WHO European Region and 
Liechtenstein. The WHO European Region comprises the following 53 countries: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Uzbekistan.
Public health surveillance has been defined as 
“the continuous, systematic collection, analysis 
and interpretation of health-related data 
needed for the planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of public health practice” (Langmuir, 
1963). Such surveillance supports the tracking 
of progress towards specified health targets, 
setting priorities and informing public health 
policy and strategies. 
Drinking-water surveillance can be defined 
as the “continuous and vigilant public health 
assessment and review of the safety and 
acceptability of drinking-water supplies” (WHO, 
1976). 
Safe drinking-water is vital for 
good health
Drinking-water can be a vehicle for the 
transmission of disease, so the provision of safe 
drinking-water has a vital public health function. 
In the pan-European region,1 waterborne 
outbreaks of disease continue to occur and 
place significant burdens on communities 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2016a). 
As shown in Fig. 2, contamination of water 
sources (such as intrusion of animal faeces due 
to heavy rain and discharges of wastewater), 
treatment deficiencies (malfunctioning of 
the disinfection equipment, for instance) 
and distribution network failures (including 
Fig. 2. The number of events of waterborne disease outbreaks and the number of cases of illness 
among consumers in Europe, North America and New Zealand, 2000–2014 
Distribution network failure
Treatment deficiencies
NUMBER OF EVENTS
NUMBER OF CASES
Surface water contamination
Groundwater contamination
0
0 5 10 15 20 25
100 000 200 000 300 000 400 000 500 000 600 000
Source: modified from Moreira & Bondelind (2017). Reproduced from Journal of Water And Health volume 15, issue number 1, pages 83–96, 
with permission from the copyright holders, IWA Publishing.
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cross-connections, pipe breaks and wastewater 
intrusion) frequently cause waterborne disease 
outbreaks and illness among consumers (see 
Case study 1 from Hungary). 
By providing drinking-water, every supplier 
assumes responsibility for protecting public 
health. It is vital for suppliers to apply good 
practice to make sure they operate in such a way 
as to minimize risks to health and maximize the 
acceptability of drinking-water to consumers. It 
is incumbent upon the supplier to produce and 
supply drinking-water that is as safe as can be 
achieved in particular circumstances. This is best 
achieved by adopting the WHO-recommended 
WSP approach (Box 1), which has been taken 
up in many drinking-water regulations across 
the pan-European region (see Case study 2 
from the United Kingdom (England and Wales) 
and Case study 3 from Belarus). 
Box 1. Protect rather than detect – the WSP approach
The WSP approach is recommended in the WHO guidelines for drinking-water quality as a core pillar of 
the framework for safe drinking-water (Fig. 1). WSPs provide the most effective means of consistently 
ensuring the safety of a drinking-water supply through the use of a comprehensive risk-assessment 
and risk-management approach that encompasses all steps in the water supply, from catchment to 
consumer (WHO, 2017a). 
The WSP approach presents a proactive and preventive means of assuring safe drinking-water. Essential 
requirements of the WSP approach are to:
• identify systematically any hazards that may have adverse impacts on health (such as pathogens 
or chemicals) and hazardous events that introduce hazards to the supply system or fail to remove 
them (such as rainfall events and treatment failures) for each supply stage, from source-water 
catchment, through water abstraction, to treatment, storage and distribution to the point of use;
• assess the levels of health risks associated with exposure to the identified hazards under different 
scenarios and risks of exceeding drinking-water standards: risk assessment identifies the 
requirement for improvement interventions and management attention to mitigate the identified 
risks; 
• establish effective measures to control the risks identified: control measures (or preventative 
measures or barriers to contamination) prevent hazards gaining access to water (through the 
catchment or distribution system, for instance) or remove or minimize hazards from the water (such 
as through treatment); control measures can start with catchment controls, continue through the 
various stages of treatment barriers and include maintaining high-quality drinking-water as it flows 
through distribution and storage systems, including the plumbing systems in buildings;
• establish management and operational monitoring procedures to ensure the chosen control 
measures operate optimally at all times; and
• establish procedures for verification monitoring (in addition to those used in operational monitoring) 
to determine whether the performance of the drinking-water supply is in compliance with the 
water-quality standards and is acceptable to consumers, and procedures for auditing to confirm 
the WSP’s completeness, adequate implementation and effectiveness. 
The WSP process leads to the development of supply-specific profiles that identify chemical, 
microbiological, physical and radiological hazards of local relevance and concern, including the events 
and routes through which the hazards can enter the supply. These profiles allow the water supplier 
to identify appropriate management interventions and control measures to minimize the risks of the 
hazard reaching the consumer in concentrations that are likely to cause adverse effects, including 
rejection of aesthetically unacceptable water. 
Further details of the WSP approach and its core requirements are set out in the WHO guidelines 
for drinking-water quality (WHO, 2017a) and supporting technical guidance documents, such as the 
Water safety plan manual: step-by-step risk management for drinking-water suppliers (WHO, 2009) 
and the Water safety plan: a field guide to improving drinking-water safety in small communities (WHO 
Regional Office for Europe, 2014).
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Functions of drinking-water 
surveillance
Surveillance contributes to the protection of 
public health by promoting improvement of 
the quality, quantity, accessibility, reliability, 
affordability and continuity of drinking-water 
supplies. It is an essential part of ensuring that 
public health is protected against the threats that 
can come from drinking-water. The authorities 
responsible for drinking-water surveillance need 
to be independent of water suppliers, and their 
roles cover the following areas (WHO, 2017a):
• ensuring public health oversight of 
organized drinking-water supplies; 
• providing public health oversight and 
information support to populations 
without access to organized drinking-
water supplies, including communities and 
households;
• building and maintaining public trust in 
drinking-water supplies to maximize the 
benefits of safe and acceptable supplies;
• promoting incremental improvement of 
drinking-water supplies;
• consolidating information from different 
sources to enable understanding of the 
overall drinking-water supply situation for 
a country or region as a whole or as part of 
the development of coherent public health-
centred policies and practices; and 
• participating in the investigation, 
reporting and compilation of outbreaks of 
waterborne disease.
 
Case study 1
A drinking-water outbreak in Miskolc, Hungary, 
following an extreme precipitation event
Miskolc is a city of approximately 80 000 inhabitants located in north-eastern Hungary. It 
relies on karstic water for its drinking-water supply. Following an extreme precipitation event, 
it experienced a multi-aetiological drinking-water outbreak affecting over 3500 people.
The water of the karstic spring generally is delivered without treatment, except for safety 
chlorination. The water supply was monitored regularly according to the frequency defined 
in drinking-water legislation. Samples were tested routinely for turbidity, microbiological and 
chemical parameters. Increased turbidity was observed during a week of extreme precipitation, 
but faecal indicators were not detected, so normal operation was continued. 
The water supply was resampled following the three-day Pentecost holiday, but by the time 
the results arrived (two days later), general practitioners had already reported increased 
incidence of gastrointestinal illness. A boil water advisory was issued and the consumption 
of water restricted. The advice was upheld until the operation of the water supply returned to 
normal. Epidemiological investigation confirmed the consumption of tap water as the source 
of infection. 
The cause of the outbreak was the extreme precipitation, which changed the underground 
current in the karst and washed contamination into the water source. Routine testing for faecal 
indicators was insufficient in preventing the outbreak. Turbidity was found to be indicative of 
events leading to the deterioration of water quality. Online turbidity monitors were installed 
and a control value was assigned to the measurements as an early warning of potential 
contaminations. 
Further information on the case study can be found in Dura et al. (2010). 
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Case study 2
Introduction of risk assessments improves 
compliance in the United Kingdom (England and 
Wales)
The Drinking Water Inspectorate for England & Wales (DWI) is an independent regulator. 
Legislation and regulations clearly specify WSP requirements for water companies (public 
supplies) and local authorities (private supplies). Water companies report summary 
information to DWI, which assesses the implementation of the WSP approach. Feedback 
information is provided to the water company and any actions identified to deal with 
unmitigated risks are set out in legally binding documents (notices). Ongoing audit focuses 
on validation of existing control measures and identification of additional risk mitigation. 
Local authorities in England and Wales are responsible for implementing the Private Water 
Supplies Regulations 2009. Their regulatory duties include risk assessment for each supply 
in their area (primarily through on-site visits), monitoring each supply for compliance with 
drinking-water standards, and investigating and taking enforcement action where a risk to 
human health is identified or non-compliance is found. Risk assessments are reviewed if new 
information becomes available (but at least once every five years). DWI’s role with regard 
to private water supplies is to oversee the risk assessment approach taken and provide 
technical support, respond to enquiries, and provide training and advice to local authorities. 
A risk assessment tool for local authorities has been developed, and the DWI website 
includes a specific section on small private supplies (DWI, 2019). The tool pre-identifies 
most hazards associated with different private water-supply types. It features sections that 
can be selected depending on the components that make up the supply (borehole source, 
ultraviolet treatment and tank storage, for example). Any hazard that has not been pre-
identified can be added to the tool by the risk assessor. The assessor must then work through 
the risk assessment and score the likelihood of a hazard manifesting in the supply for the 
supply components selected. 
The risk assessment in the tool is based on a 5x5 matrix in which the severity and likelihood 
scores are multiplied together to give a risk score for the different hazards. The severity score 
is predefined, but the assessor needs to gauge the likelihood of the hazard manifesting in the 
supply. A document gives detailed guidance on how the likelihood score should be chosen. 
The risk assessment tool produces an overall risk rating of the supply and any high or very 
high risks are recorded on the risk register. Should any high or very high risks exist, the risk 
assessment tool prompts the assessor to specify the required mitigation measures to reduce 
the risk to an acceptable level within a specified timeframe. These mitigation measures are 
recorded in an action plan that can be used to form a programme of improvement works for 
the supply operator to implement.
Experience in England and Wales shows that the introduction of WSPs to legislation 
has resulted in improved compliance, especially for small private supplies, and informs 
prioritization of attention and surveillance activities. WSP outcomes are also used to justify 
investment needs.
9Key message 1: Surveillance is a core public health function 
Case study 3
Implementation of a risk-based approach in 
drinking-water legislation in Belarus
While Belarussian sanitary-epidemiological legislation contained some elements of health-
risk analysis, there was no requirement for a comprehensive risk-assessment scheme in 
drinking-water supply. The traditional surveillance system primarily was based on checking 
compliance with water-quality standards and sanitary norms. 
The Law of the Republic of Belarus of 2012 on “Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of the 
Population” was amended in 2016. It now provides a framework for the application of risk 
assessment as a basis from which to take measures to prevent and minimize identified risks 
(risk management) and to inform stakeholders about the risk-assessment outcomes. The 
new Law on Drinking Water Supply of 2019 includes requirements on health-risk assessment 
in water-supply systems to guarantee the safety of drinking-water supplied to consumers. 
A number of supporting by-laws have been developed, including Guideline No. 027-1215 
“Method of risk analysis in drinking-water supply systems” (2019) and Guideline No. 019-1118 
“Method of hygienic assessment of drinking-water” (2018) issued by the Ministry of Health, 
as well as Resolution No. 914 “Specific sanitary and epidemiological requirements for the 
maintenance and operation of sources and systems of drinking-water supply” (2018) from 
the Council of Ministers.
According to the new legislation, all entities that may constitute a risk to health should 
undergo procedures for risk assessment. The by-laws define a set of risk-assessment criteria 
for drinking-water service providers, large- and small-scale. These criteria cover all stages of 
the drinking-water supply chain and also consider water-quality monitoring data. 
The risk-assessment approach allows evaluation of existing conditions in a drinking-water 
supply system and reveal the most vulnerable stages that require more attention and 
remedial measures. Outcomes of risk assessments inform the design of drinking-water 
quality-monitoring programmes that reflect the specificities of a water-supply system and 
help to plan and justify supervisory and control activities (inspections) of the responsible 
surveillance agency. 
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Key message 2:  
Risk-based surveillance is a 
governmental responsibility
It is a responsibility of the government to establish legal and regulatory 
requirements for implementation of risk-based drinking-water surveillance 
that adequately protect public health. 
The potential for harm when water supplies fail 
is significant, and those responsible for water-
supply systems need to be equipped with clear 
strategies, rules and regulations that ensure the 
safety of drinking-water. 
The government is responsible for setting 
health targets and establishing appropriate 
drinking-water quality standards and relevant 
legislation, including surveillance mandates to 
ensure that water suppliers are fulfilling their 
obligations (Box 2).
Implementation and enforcement typically is 
the responsibility of the ministry of (public) 
health and its regional or departmental offices, 
or an environmental protection department 
of local government (see Case study 2 from 
England and Wales).
The following factors should be considered to 
ensure an effective surveillance system is built 
and sustained:
• establish an enabling legal framework 
and legal support for drinking-water 
surveillance;
• establish a legislative and institutional 
basis for effective drinking-water 
surveillance that promotes local risk 
assessments as the basis for prioritizing 
surveillance and responses;
• review and update national drinking-water 
quality standards by integrating a risk-
based approach;
• ensure that surveillance covers the 
whole of the drinking-water system, 
from the sources and activities in the 
catchment through abstraction, treatment, 
Box 2. Main activities of surveillance agencies
Surveillance agencies’ main activities are to:
• investigate waterborne disease in the population, including waterborne outbreaks, and assess 
whether health targets are being met;
• check compliance with drinking-water quality standards through direct water-quality testing and 
review of water suppliers’ monitoring records; 
• audit WSPs and verify their effectiveness;
• conduct on-site sanitary inspections;
• provide advice and support to water suppliers, particularly for small supplies that may have only 
limited resources; and
• analyse water-quality trends and the outcomes from sanitary inspections and/or WSP audits 
locally and nationally to inform local remedial measures and wider policy for protection of water 
resources and drinking-water.
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storage and distribution to the point of 
consumption;
• take into account the particular 
circumstances of small drinking-water 
supplies and establish the surveillance 
agency’s specific responsibility for 
supporting small systems;
• provide clear definitions of water 
suppliers’ and surveillance agencies’ roles 
and responsibilities; 
• promote effective coordination and 
collaboration between the water supplier 
and the public health surveillance agency 
and any other agencies that might play a 
role;
• assess human-resource and institutional 
capacity and identify needs for 
strengthening surveillance of the drinking-
water supply;
• secure adequate human resource and 
financing for drinking-water surveillance 
programmes;
• implement capacity-building at different 
levels, including training programmes 
for public health officers, inspectors and 
water operators; 
• build and sustain an inventory/
information system that supports effective 
surveillance;
• ensure adequate reporting and flow of 
water-quality data among responsible 
parties;
• analyse and use surveillance data in 
improving water-quality regulations and 
to inform improvements by the water 
supplier; and
• create an enabling environment to ensure 
the exchange of information to support 
the water supplier’s responsibilities and 
the surveillance agency’s operations. 
While surveillance and establishing the frame-
work within which surveillance authorities 
operate is the responsibility of the government, 
water suppliers are responsible for ensuring 
supply systems are capable of delivering 
safe drinking-water at all times and verifying 
that they do so. This includes developing and 
implementing a suitable WSP to manage 
the supply chain from catchment to tap and 
meeting relevant water-quality standards. 
In jurisdictions where water suppliers do 
not have the mandate or responsibility to 
manage drinking-water quality beyond the 
point of transfer to premises, it should be the 
responsibility of the building owner or manager 
to establish a building WSP to ensure safe 
drinking-water at the tap (WHO, 2011). 
There may be a need for the surveillance agency 
to impose penalties on water suppliers to ensure 
and encourage compliance with standards and 
WSP principles; as such, surveillance agencies 
must be supported by enforceable regulations 
(see Case study 2 from England and Wales, 
Case study 4 from Portugal and Case study 5 
from Norway). The system should not foster 
antagonism, however, and penalties should be 
used as a last resort. It is important that the 
surveillance agency should work to develop a 
good trusting relationship with suppliers. It is in 
the interests of all parties that water suppliers 
should feel able to communicate problems 
to the surveillance agency without fear of 
automatic prosecution or the application of 
sanctions.
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Case study 4
Focusing needs in the water supply in Portugal
In 2017, water supplies operating under a WSP covered 32% of the population of Portugal. 
Water suppliers must submit an annual water-quality control plan to the Water and Waste 
Services Regulatory Authority for approval. The plan includes details of parameters, frequency 
of sampling and sampling points in the supply chain from source to consumer.
Since 2019, national legislation has required the implementation of a risk-based approach 
to establishing water-quality control plans. Once the plan is approved, monitoring data 
are submitted online and can be assessed by drinking-water and health authorities. If non-
compliance is observed, the water supplier must inform the local public health authority, 
which then carries out a risk assessment to analyse the parameters, exposure time and 
susceptibility of exposed populations. The authority can then restrict water use, make 
recommendations to the public and call on the water supplier to introduce changes to 
treatment processes. Health authorities also assess drinking-water supply systems, with a 
special focus on small supplies. 
The country has a mandatory disease-notification system (including for water-related 
infectious diseases) and a national epidemiological surveillance system.
 
Case study 5
Risk-based routine drinking-water quality-
monitoring schemes in Norway
Around 4.6 million people (90% of the population) of Norway are provided with drinking-
water from approximately 1500 regulated water-supply utilities. Most of these are in public 
ownership, but private actors operate some smaller water supplies. The Norwegian Food 
Safety Authority (NFSA) provides oversight to water utilities that produce more than 10 m3 
of drinking-water per day. 
Drinking-water legislation has been in existence since the 1950s and is subject to regular 
updates. The latest version was brought into force in January 2017. It is based on the European 
Council Directive 98/83/EC, particularly its latest amendment through Commission Directive 
(EU) 2015/1787, and now features a distinct risk-based approach (see Case study 11 from the 
European Union (EU). The overarching principle in the updated law is the requirement to 
conduct an “assessment and management of hazards”. This assessment shall map potential 
hazards from catchment to consumer and is supposed to inform all actions taken by the 
water utility. Water utilities are obliged to manage the risks relevant to their water-supply 
system systematically in terms of long-term and preparedness planning and in day-to-day 
operation.
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Case study 5 contd
Water utilities shall also establish a risk-based routine monitoring plan based on the 
assessment of local hazards. The plan should include details of the location of representative 
sampling points, sampling frequencies (based on the size of the water utility) and relevant 
parameters. Analysis for Escherichia coli is mandatory, and water utilities that produce more 
than 10 m3 of drinking-water per day have a minimum requirement to monitor for intestinal 
enterococci, colour, turbidity and acceptable aesthetic appearance (free from taste/odour).
The water utility is responsible for defining its risks and monitoring any relevant parameter 
to their system. Based on risk assessments, the NSFA can grant dispensations from meeting 
the standards laid down in the drinking-water legislation. If a risk assessment demonstrates 
that a substance does not represent a health risk, the water utility may reduce the frequency 
of sampling if all representative results from drinking-water quality analysis in a three year 
period are below 60% of the standard value (with a minimum of two samples taken); in 
addition, a parameter may also be excluded from monitoring if all results are below 30% of 
the standard value. 
NFSA receives yearly reports with data on water quality and system information from the 
water utilities. These data are used by the NFSA to perform risk-based inspections and 
audits. Information retrieved from yearly reports is further analysed and made available for 
multiple uses, such as statistics and research.
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Key message 3:  
Risk-based surveillance points at 
what needs to be looked at
Risk-based drinking-water surveillance identifies the hazards that pose the 
greatest risks to the population and supports the development of appropriate 
and efficient monitoring programmes for individual supplies.
Risk-based drinking-water surveillance is 
considered best practice within the framework 
for safe drinking-water (Fig. 1). It helps to 
protect the health of consumers in the most 
resource-effective way by identifying whether 
the risks are under proper and continuing 
control and targeting resources where they will 
have the greatest health benefit. The outcomes 
of risk-based drinking-water surveillance can 
inform national and subnational priorities in 
terms of addressing risks to drinking-water 
supply and putting in place effective supporting 
programmes.
Risk-based surveillance reflects a shift in focus 
from overreliance on end-product (compliance) 
testing of a predetermined list of water-quality 
parameters to promoting a proactive approach 
to identifying, controlling and monitoring critical 
risks in water supply. 
Routine water-quality monitoring remains 
an essential part of risk-based surveillance 
as a means of verifying that a drinking-water 
supply system continuously is providing safe 
drinking-water. This requires, however, that 
the parameters, siting and frequency of the 
sampling reflect the characteristics and hazards 
of the water-supply system in their local context. 
The difference between pathogens 
and chemicals 
While pathogens are recognized as the primary 
cause of waterborne morbidity and disease, 
chemicals cannot be ignored. Pathogens 
cause illness and even death in humans due to 
exposure through drinking-water, sometimes 
by a single exposure. By contrast, only a small 
number of chemicals – arsenic, fluoride, nitrate/
nitrite and lead – are known to cause disease 
through drinking-water, almost invariably 
following long-term exposure. Other chemicals, 
both inorganic and organic, may adversely affect 
health, but most available information relates 
to laboratory studies in animals that are used 
to identify concentrations of these chemicals 
that are considered safe. In addition, advanced 
analytical techniques can measure a wide range 
of chemicals, mostly in wastewater-impacted 
waters, typically at very low concentrations. 
Other chemicals that are not of direct concern 
for health can affect acceptability to consumers 
and may cause them to turn to other sources 
that may not be microbiologically safe. 
Pathogens are usually present in source waters 
from human and animal faecal matter and 
include bacteria, viruses and parasites, although 
a few, such as Legionella, can also proliferate in 
distribution systems. Where there is potential 
for pathogens to be present, it is important that 
appropriate barriers are put in place and are 
functioning efficiently at all times, as pathogen 
numbers can vary significantly, frequently 
over a short time. The traditional approach to 
measuring faecal-indicator bacteria in drinking-
water means that an event in which pathogen 
contamination breaks through will be picked up 
only by chance; by the time a laboratory result is 
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obtained and reported, the contaminated water 
will probably have been drunk. Outbreaks are 
often detected by consumers falling sick (see 
Case study 1 from Hungary).
Most source waters will contain a range of 
chemicals and microorganisms that are naturally 
present or arise from discharges, including from 
industry, agriculture and sewage. Surface water 
is generally at greater risk than groundwater, 
but groundwater also varies in its vulnerability. 
Pathogens and chemical contaminants can 
also arise in treatment, in distribution and 
in plumbing systems in buildings (such as 
Legionella and lead). 
Identifying surveillance priorities 
Surveillance goes beyond simply checking for 
compliance of drinking-water with the standards, 
which has limitations in confirming the safety 
of a water supply. It also aims to build an 
understanding of the entire water-supply system, 
local risks and causes for contamination from 
catchment to the point of consumption, and 
how these risks are being managed against the 
core principles of a WSP (Box 1). Risk assessment 
drives the purpose and focus of water-quality 
monitoring and control measures to mitigate 
contamination risks effectively at all times. 
The chemical and microbiological quality 
of water can and does change between the 
point the water enters the building and the 
consumer’s tap. Systematic management of 
water in buildings by the owner or manager 
through, for example, a building WSP is a vital 
part of maintaining drinking-water safety; 
consequently, it should be subject to surveillance 
attention. A preventative risk-based approach is 
especially important in buildings, as it virtually is 
impossible to monitor every tap.
WSPs draw on in-depth knowledge of a water-
supply system and provide an important 
mechanism for identifying surveillance priorities 
(Fig. 3). The outcomes of a WSP, including those 
from available building WSPs in the supply area, 
identify the main hazards and hazardous events 
(and their health risks) in the catchment and 
throughout the supply chain up to the point of 
consumption. This, in turn:
• identifies the water-quality parameters 
that are most significant to protect health 
and which therefore should be the focus of 
surveillance;
• identifies where to sample, including in 
high-risk areas of the distribution system 
such as dead ends or remote zones and 
in buildings that host vulnerable members 
of the population (schools, hospitals and 
nursing homes, for example) or where 
people will be present for extended periods 
of time (like hotels);
• informs sampling frequencies for high-risk 
parameters, including consideration of 
seasonal/climatic variations that may lead 
to changes in the quality of source waters 
and/or in the distribution system; and 
• points to the most appropriate operational 
monitoring to ensure that the barriers/
treatments to the high-risk parameters are 
working properly at all times.
Fig. 3. WSPs inform risk-based surveillance
 
WSP RISK ASSESSMENT RISK-BASED SURVEILLANCE
Hazard Hazardous event Risk
Hazard Hazardous event Risk
Hazard Hazardous event Risk
Hazard Hazardous event Risk
Hazard Hazardous event Risk
Prioritizing monitoring parameters 
considering local hazards and risks
Defining monitoring frequencies 
considering local hazards and risks
Selecting monitoring locations 
considering local hazards and risks
Informs
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Risk-based surveillance uses these outcomes 
to prioritize surveillance efforts based on public 
health risks and target resources where most 
needed, thereby leading to the greatest benefit 
for health while employing the most efficient 
use of available resources. It also informs which 
substances should be included in standards on 
a country-wide basis as part of the risk-based 
standard-setting process.
A further consideration in risk-based surveillance 
is the size of the population supplied. 
Surveillance attention frequently prioritizes 
central water supplies that serve water to large 
population groups in urban centres. Small rural 
supplies usually do not receive the same level 
of attention and support due to the difference 
in the number of people exposed to possible 
contaminated water and, consequently, the 
scale of health consequences. 
This principle is reflected typically in the 
regulatory frameworks that drive the activities 
of surveillance agencies and water suppliers 
and define the number of samples taken and 
frequency of sampling. The WHO guidelines for 
drinking-water quality recommend increasing 
the sampling frequency and the number of 
samples as the population supplied increases. 
For large water supplies, sample numbers can 
be large, and the frequency of sampling high. 
At the opposite end of the scale populated by 
small water supplies, the number of samples 
can be small – often a single sample – and the 
frequency of sampling extremely low – perhaps 
once every few years. This may be adequate to 
assess water quality for chemical contaminants 
with stable concentrations, but where there is 
significant variation in the interval between 
sampling events, such as with microbiological 
contaminants, the quality of the water will 
be unknown if reliance is placed on these 
monitoring data alone (see Key message 4).
Because the risk-based approach to managing 
drinking-water quality focuses on developing an 
understanding of prevailing hazards and their 
prevention, the apparent imbalance between 
small and large supplies in terms of surveillance 
attention and sampling intervals is countered 
by shifting from overreliance on monitoring to 
identifying and prioritizing small systems that 
require increased attention and interventions. 
Risk-based surveillance includes 
WSP auditing
The central role of WSPs in a risk-based approach 
means the surveillance agency has a key role in 
auditing the WSP associated with a particular 
supply. Such audits provide an independent 
and systematic check of a WSP to confirm its 
completeness, adequate implementation and 
effectiveness. They make sure that the WSP is 
sufficiently comprehensive in terms of hazard 
analysis and risk assessment, that established 
control measures are adequate and that they 
work at all times. Audits may confirm compliance 
with regulatory WSP requirements, support 
the continuous improvement of a WSP, offer 
opportunities to provide technical guidance 
and support to WSP teams, and address gaps 
in understanding. WHO’s practical guide to 
auditing WSPs provides further information 
(WHO, 2015a).
The outcomes of an audit help surveillance 
authorities to prioritize their attention and 
resources on the supplies that show critical gaps 
in the WSP and/or its implementation, indicating 
risks that are not addressed adequately and 
are likely to compromise public health if not 
properly rectified. Audit outcomes can guide 
prioritization of supplies that need to improve to 
ensure better water-quality risk management is 
in place and/or identification of areas requiring 
attention during future audits. A collective 
analysis of WSP audit outcomes at subnational 
or national level can also inform broader policy-
making and improvement programming in the 
field of water and health, particularly in the 
context of small supplies. 
Risk-based standard-setting
One of the primary means by which 
surveillance agencies determine that drinking-
water does not pose an unacceptable risk 
to the health of consumers is by monitoring 
against national standards that define the 
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admissible concentrations of a range of 
biological, chemical and physical parameters. 
The list of standards or guidelines for chemical 
parameters is often quite long, reflecting a wide 
range of circumstances and the potential for 
contamination in different places; monitoring 
all of these would require significant resources 
and would record mostly zeros.
WHO has recommended a risk-based approach 
to standard-setting for national authorities, 
particularly in resource-limited countries 
(WHO, 2018), that supports incremental 
improvement over time. This helps to 
develop a set of standards appropriate to the 
circumstances in a country by focusing on the 
most important parameters based on risk to 
health, occurrence in water sources or drinking-
water and concentrations found. These will 
include microbiological contaminants that 
primarily come from faecal contamination 
and will also include a number of chemical 
contaminants, particularly the few that have 
been shown to cause human health effects 
through drinking-water. The standards provide 
a basic set of norms that can be amended or 
expanded over time as circumstances allow, 
including in response to long-term impacts of 
climate change and other environmental and 
socioeconomic changes. The overall approach 
is supported by the application of supply-
specific WSPs. 
Incremental improvement is an 
important goal
Incremental improvement towards long-term 
goals is an important concept in the allocation 
of resources to improve drinking-water safety. 
Risk-based surveillance is an important element 
in the development of strategies for incremental 
improvement of drinking-water supply services 
(WHO, 2017a).
It is possible to make step-by-step improvements 
over time, whether in terms of infrastructure, 
management procedures or increasing skills 
and knowledge of operators through training. 
One of the roles of the surveillance agency is to 
help water suppliers, particularly small suppliers, 
to identify improvements and put ways of 
achieving them in place. 
Improvements may require financial resources, 
in which case the surveillance agency is well 
placed to assist in ensuring that the highest 
priorities for protection of health are addressed 
first, based on the risk-assessment outcomes 
of the WSP and surveillance findings. The 
surveillance agency should also monitor 
whether improvements are being achieved 
and, based on the experiences gained and the 
resources available, help redefine priorities over 
time as improvements are made.
Particular considerations for small 
supplies
Public health can be better protected by 
identifying and understanding risk factors 
associated with the individual drinking-water 
supply. While this is important for all supplies, 
it may be particularly relevant for small 
water supplies. They are often managed by 
communities or individuals and are not always 
appropriately supported financially, technically 
or politically in the same way as large utility-
managed supplies (see Case study 6 from Serbia 
and Case study 7 from Germany). Small supplies 
are widespread and are often found in remote 
locations, which can make them hard to reach 
for surveillance activities. They are particularly 
vulnerable to microbiological contamination. 
Major risk factors include animal husbandry and 
other agricultural practices in close proximity to 
rural small water systems in combination with 
heavy rainfall events and inadequate treatment 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2016b; 2016c). 
Of the 175 waterborne outbreaks notified 
between 1998 and 2012 in Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, affecting 85  995 indi-
viduals, 76% were associated with single-
household supplies (Guzman-Herrador et al., 
2015). Private water supplies serve 
approximately 0.5% of the population in 
England and Wales but have been shown to 
be responsible for 36% of waterborne disease 
outbreaks (Said et al., 2003). Reports of 
outbreaks in Canada and the United States of 
19
Key message 3: Risk-based surveillance points at what needs to be looked at 
America indicate that approximately 50% of 
cases caused by waterborne diseases occur in 
small, non-community drinking-water systems 
(Pons et al., 2015).
For these reasons, it is important that risk-
based surveillance pays sufficient attention 
to small supplies. Surveillance authorities in 
some jurisdictions are directly involved in 
water-quality monitoring in small supplies 
(see, for example, Case study 8 from Lithuania 
on testing private wells for households with 
infants or expectant mothers), but they have a 
particular role in providing or facilitating advice 
to small suppliers in view of normally limited 
resources and expertise. The advice may cover 
assistance in identifying and explaining the 
implications of locally relevant risks (see also 
Key message 4 on risk assessment tools and 
sanitary inspection), offering solutions on 
mitigating the risks and providing continuing 
support and information (see Case study 2 
from England and Wales and Case study 7 from 
Germany). Policing is typically not the primary 
role of the surveillance authority in the context 
of small systems. The eventual objective is 
to promote incremental improvement of the 
system over time. 
Case study 6
Rapid assessment of drinking-water quality and 
prevailing sanitary conditions in small water 
supplies in rural areas of Serbia
Drinking-water surveillance is conducted by the network of institutes of public health under 
the Ministry of Health. Drinking-water quality parameters and sampling frequency are 
regulated by the Rule on Hygienic Correctness of Drinking-Water for water supplies that 
serve more than 20 people or five households. Enforcement in rural areas, however, is weak, 
resulting in a lack of data on drinking-water quality and sanitary conditions in small water 
supplies. Challenges such as unregulated ownership of the numbers of rural small water 
supplies, lack of responsibility for maintenance and monitoring of facilities and testing the 
quality of drinking-water hamper adequate drinking-water surveillance. 
Serbia has used the target-setting framework under the Protocol on Water and Health to 
address challenges related to small water supplies. Serbia’s national targets set under the 
Protocol include a specific target on undertaking a systematic assessment of drinking-water 
quality and prevailing conditions in rural water supplies to improve the evidence base and 
inform surveillance attention and improvement interventions.
A national-level survey conducted in 2016 investigated two types of water-supply systems: 
small piped systems serving up to 10 000 people; and individual supplies serving less than five 
households or 20 inhabitants. In total, 1318 supplies were investigated by using standardized 
sanitary inspections and testing for Escherichia coli and 10 physicochemical parameters. 
Overall, 83% of individual supplies and 63% of small piped systems investigated did not 
comply with national water-quality standards. About one third of all water samples taken 
were found to be microbiologically contaminated. The dominant risks revealed by sanitary 
inspection were absence of regular chlorination, non-established and unmanaged sanitary 
protection zones, sources of pollution placed nearby the source and unsatisfactory technical 
conditions.
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Case study 6 contd
Combined analysis of sanitary-inspection and water-quality data using a risk-priority matrix 
(Fig. CS1) revealed that 29% of small piped systems and 41% of individual supplies show 
a higher or urgent priority for improvement actions to prevent water contamination and 
protect public health (high and very high risk level).
This systematic assessment helped to establish systematic baseline information on small 
systems and enabled the identification of the most important causes of contamination. The 
outcomes of the assessment allowed public health authorities to prioritize their surveillance 
efforts through identifying the supply systems at greatest risk that required increased 
attention and guidance, including providing support to leverage local improvement action. 
The survey induced policy actions and measures for improving rural water supplies directed 
at amending and enforcing existing legislation and programmes and the development of 
new regulations.
Fig. CS1. Risk-priority matrix for piped systems (individual supplies) in Serbia
Sanitary inspection scoreE. coli count 
(CFUa/100 ml) 0–2
28.4% 
(23.1%)
42.0% 
(36.3%)
23.2% 
(33.5%)
6.4% 
(7.1%)
< 1
1–10
11–100
> 100
3–5 Risk level
Low No action 
required
Low action 
priority
Higher action 
priority
Urgent action 
priority
Intermediate
High
Very high
Action level6–8 9–10
a CFU: colony-forming units. 
Further information on the case study can be found in Jovanović et al. (2017) and WHO 
Regional Office for Europe (2017).
 
Case study 7
Addressing surveillance of private wells in Germany
Around 11% of the population of Germany are supplied by small systems that serve less than 
5000 people. Another 0.7% are served by individual supplies (private wells). 
The German Drinking Water Ordinance establishes the requirements for monitoring the quality 
of drinking-water. Whereas limit values apply to all sizes of supplies, surveillance authorities 
may grant deviations from the scope of chemical parameters for private wells (without 
commercial or public activity) if the parameter is not expected to occur at concentrations 
that would jeopardize compliance with the limit value. 
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Case study 7 contd
Monitoring frequency depends on the size of the supplies. The minimum requirements for 
private wells (without commercial or public activity) are to carry out at least an annual 
analysis of five compulsory microbiological parameters and further indicator parameters, 
with additional physicochemical parameters selected by the local surveillance authority to 
be analysed at least every three years. The local surveillance authority has to be notified 
in cases of non-compliance. National reporting on water quality is mandatory for supplies 
serving more than 50 people or producing more than 10 m3 per day, but no such regular 
reporting is required for private wells; such data lie with local surveillance authorities. 
Challenges related to drinking-water surveillance in small systems in Germany include a lack 
of attention at local level, low levels of awareness of potential risks among operators, lack 
of availability of consolidated data on drinking-water quality at national level to support 
informed policy-making and the high numbers of supplies in some districts that strain the 
capacity of surveillance authorities. 
To address the challenges related to management and surveillance of private wells, an 
interinstitutional working group was established, representing all 16 federal states and other 
experts. The working group’s mandate is to review evidence related to private wells and 
provide advice and support to local authorities on how to conduct effective surveillance and 
lever improvements. The working group has developed a specific guideline for surveillance 
of private wells that addresses health authorities and acts as a practical handbook with 
recommendations for private-well owners.
Case study 8
Testing of water from dug wells used by 
pregnant women and infants in Lithuania
The Order of the Minister of Health on Diagnostics and Prophylactics for Poisonings Related 
to Nitrate and Nitrite aims to protect infants from methemoglobinemia due to elevated 
concentrations of nitrate or nitrite in drinking-water 
Upon receipt of notification from a primary health-care institution about a pregnant woman 
or an infant under 6 months of age who is using water from a dug well for potable or food 
purposes, the National Public Health Centre (PHC) under the Ministry of Health shall, within 
two weeks of receipt of the notification, organize a chemical test of the dug well to determine 
the concentration of nitrate and nitrite in drinking-water. The PHC is obliged immediately 
to inform in writing people in whose wells nitrate and nitrite concentrations exceeded the 
limit values, explaining the possible health hazards and describing safe water-preparation 
methods. The PHC specialist has to send a copy of this letter to the primary health-care 
institution that provided the information in the first place. At least every six months, the PHC 
informs the municipality in which the pregnant woman or infant resides about water quality 
in terms of concentration of nitrate and nitrite in drinking-water so the municipality can plan 
long-term prevention measures for residents. 
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Key message 4:  
Microbiological drinking-water 
quality is a key focus of risk-based 
surveillance
Identifying microbiological hazards and risks before they affect public health 
is an essential part of risk-based surveillance. 
Microbiological contamination is the most 
common and widespread health risk associated 
with drinking-water and should be treated as a 
priority.
Indicators of faecal pollution
Testing for faecal indicators is important to 
show that faecal contamination of drinking-
water is being controlled effectively by barriers 
in the water-supply system. 
The measurement of pathogenic microorganisms 
in water is complex and resource-intensive. Non-
pathogenic bacteria that are present in large 
numbers in human and animal faeces therefore 
traditionally have been used as indicators of the 
presence of faecal contamination and, potentially, 
pathogens from faeces. The indicator organisms 
used have primarily been Escherichia coli or 
thermotolerant coliforms, but others, such as 
enterococci, are also used. 
Organisms that are neither pathogenic nor 
indicators of faecal contamination, such as 
heterotrophic plate counts or total coliforms, 
are sometimes used as an indicator that 
something has changed in distribution or there 
has been ingress of contamination, both of 
which require investigation to determine the 
cause and, if appropriate, remedial action.
Several emerging pathogens, including 
Legionella, are not of faecal origin. Some 
opportunist pathogens, particularly Legionella 
and Naegleria, are not faecally derived but are 
free-living associated with biofilms and can 
multiply in distribution systems. Legionella 
is a particular problem in the distribution 
systems of buildings associated with water 
use where aerosols are formed, as Legionella 
causes respiratory disease. Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa, another opportunist pathogen, can 
also multiply in distribution systems and is of 
particular concern in hospitals and health-care 
facilities.
Faecal indicators are useful, but 
limited
For most of the 20th century, the microbiological 
quality of drinking-water supply systems 
was assessed by testing water samples for 
compliance against standards for faecal 
indicators. Sampling frequencies, methodology, 
parametric values and compliance rates were 
tightly defined in regulations governing water 
supplies. Provided that the concentrations of 
parameters were within the specified limits, the 
water was judged to be safe.
While testing for indicators of faecal 
contamination is useful to assess compliance 
with standards and has been very successful 
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in helping to prevent waterborne disease, 
overreliance on microbiological compliance 
monitoring as the sole measure of safety of a 
drinking-water supply has limitations (Box 3). 
Microbiological pathogens are not limited 
to bacteria, and illness may result from 
exposure to pathogenic viruses or protozoa, 
both of which have different environmental 
behaviour and survival characteristics than 
bacteria. Generally, faecal bacteria have lower 
persistence in the environment compared to 
viruses and protozoa and are more sensitive to 
common disinfectants. Faecal indicators found 
in water therefore do not necessarily correlate 
well with the presence of viral and protozoal 
pathogens. 
Importantly, some outbreaks of waterborne 
disease have occurred when water-quality 
testing did not detect faecal-indicator 
bacteria in drinking-water and showed 
compliance with standards, demonstrating 
that infrequent testing for such indicators is 
not always informative and may miss critical 
contamination events. In north-west England, 
for example, an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis 
occurred in a supply from a groundwater 
source in which chlorination had killed the 
indicator bacteria, meaning the indication of 
Box 3. Microbiological water-quality monitoring alone is too little 
and too late
While bacterial faecal indictors play an important role in verifying compliance with water-quality 
standards, overreliance on microbiological compliance monitoring has limitations that need to be kept 
in mind:
• the sample size is small in relation to the volume of water supplied;
• samples are relatively infrequent – numbers of pathogens vary in time and are not evenly dispersed;
• spot checks may miss critical contamination events, such as wet-weather events that affect 
source-water quality and possibly drinking-water quality, particularly in small supplies where 
sampling typically is infrequent (see Fig. B1 for a simulated example); 
• viruses and protozoa are often more resistant in the environment and to disinfection than faecal-
indicator bacteria;
• viruses are smaller than bacteria and more difficult to remove with conventional filtration;
• it takes time to measure indicators, so the water has probably been drunk by the time a problem 
is confirmed; and 
• they do not reflect opportunist pathogens that can multiply in distribution systems, including in 
buildings.
Fig. B1. Simulated example of how wet-weather events can affect source-water quality vis-à-vis 
timing of spot-sampling 
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faecal contamination was absent (Bridgman 
et al., 1995). The Cryptosporidium outbreak in 
Milwaukee, United States, is another example of 
a significant outbreak in which microbiological 
water-quality standards were compliant (Mac 
Kenzie et al., 1994). 
It is not possible to monitor pathogens or 
indicators in water on a continual basis, so 
contamination events can happen between 
checks (see Case study 1 from Hungary). 
Concentrations of microorganisms vary with 
time and are not evenly spaced through the 
water. A sample is also very small in relation to 
the amount of water being supplied, so a water 
sample for microbiological testing will only 
ever give a limited snapshot of the quality. 
The importance of understanding 
source-water quality 
Understanding source-water quality and its 
variations, as well as the root causes and 
pathways of contamination, is an important 
part of characterizing the risks to water supply 
and, therefore, of risk-based surveillance. 
The surveillance agency should promote the 
process of assessing source-water quality 
in close cooperation with the responsible 
environmental and/or water authorities and 
the water supplier. 
Reliable information on source-water quality 
is needed to define treatment requirements 
to achieve safe drinking-water and identify 
catchment protection options to reduce 
source-water contamination, such as limiting 
the access of animals to water sources by 
installing fencing and ensuring that latrines and 
septic tanks are properly sited and operated 
(further details on catchment protection are 
provided by WHO (2006; 2016). It is also 
important to consider the long-term impacts 
of climate change and other environmental 
and socioeconomic changes that may affect 
the quality of water resources. 
While understanding source-water quality is an 
important consideration for assessing chemical 
contamination, it is particularly crucial for 
microbiological quality. Surveillance agencies 
should promote and support proactive 
risk assessments to identify the sources of 
pathogens in the catchment and related 
hazardous events that will increase their 
concentration. Where available, historical data 
should be reviewed to provide a picture of the 
probable presence of pathogens and estimate 
their likely concentrations. 
Some countries measure one or more actual 
pathogens as an indicator to characterize 
source-water quality (see Case study 9 from 
the Netherlands). The aim of monitoring 
pathogens at intervals is to obtain a better 
measure of probable pathogen numbers, but 
this is not always possible due to limitations 
in the availability of laboratory capacity and 
resources. Where this is not feasible, the use 
of so-called classical faecal indicators provides 
valuable information on background loading 
and contamination peaks. 
Events such as heavy rainfall or snowmelt may 
lead to increased surface runoff and overflow 
of untreated wastewater. This can lead to 
rapid deterioration of source-water quality 
that may result in a challenge to drinking-
water treatment. Identifying such events and 
responding accordingly by increasing the 
frequency of sampling where, for example, 
the source water is considered vulnerable 
is the first step in planning and establishing 
processes or procedures to mitigate the risks 
when the events happen. Surveillance agencies 
should have the authority to request or enforce 
such action. 
Post-treatment contamination in 
distribution is important 
Microbiological contamination of treated 
drinking-water in distribution systems, including 
building plumbing systems, can also occur. 
Once pathogens have entered the distribution 
system, it is likely that consumers will be exposed 
due to lack of downstream control measures, 
including disinfectant residuals that may not 
be sufficient to overcome the contamination 
event (WHO, 2017a). Developing a sound 
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understanding of where the distribution system 
is vulnerable and what steps need to be taken 
to rectify problems is therefore an important 
part of risk-based surveillance. 
Hazardous events associated with distribution 
systems are diverse. Examples include, but are 
not limited to, the following (WHO, 2014):
• low water pressure, especially during 
intermittent supply, that may allow 
infiltration of contaminated water into the 
system through breaks, cracks, joints and 
pinholes;
• unintended cross-connections with non-
drinking-water systems (such as rainwater, 
greywater and wastewater);
• ingress of contaminated water into 
poorly maintained service reservoirs with 
compromised infrastructural integrity;
• contamination during repair or 
maintenance works; 
• biofilm formation and growth of 
heterotrophic bacteria and amoebae; and
• growth of opportunistic pathogens 
in building plumbing systems due to 
unfavourable temperature conditions. 
Risk-based surveillance should take due 
consideration of the network attributes and 
vulnerabilities of the distribution system, 
including consideration of flow rates, water-
retention times, age and materials of pipes, 
seasons of low and high demand and remote 
sections of the system. While these should be 
key outcomes of a WSP of a particular water 
supply, the surveillance agency can support 
and advise in choosing suitable monitoring 
and inspection regimes that would best reflect 
the particularities of the distribution system. 
Guidance on selecting sampling sites and 
frequencies for compliance or verification 
monitoring purposes is available (WHO, 2014). 
Detection of faecal indicators 
requires attention
Detection of a faecal indicator in a drinking-
water sample requires urgent attention by the 
surveillance agency to ensure no threat to 
public health. An immediate investigation is 
essential, with the objectives of:
• confirming that the monitoring result is 
credible through repeat sampling and that 
the source of contamination is not within 
a single building;
• ensuring there is no failure of any barriers; 
• identifying possible sources of faecal 
contamination;
• increasing vigilance for reports of illness in 
the community; and 
• taking appropriate public health 
responses (such as boil water notices 
and provision of alternative supplies) if 
continued or significant contamination is 
confirmed.
There is detailed advice in the WHO guidelines 
for drinking-water quality (2017a) and 
supporting documents (WHO, 2015b; WHO, 
2018; WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2019).
Operational monitoring is a key 
function
Operational monitoring is carried out by the 
water supplier to ensure that all barriers or 
control measures throughout the water-supply 
chain, including water treatment, are operating 
efficiently at all times (Box 4). Risk-based 
surveillance includes assessing the suitability 
and summary results of operational monitoring 
undertaken by the water supplier as an integral 
part of the WSP. Regular inspections and 
audits of the treatment and other barriers help 
to assure public health
Operational monitoring does not remove the 
need for compliance monitoring, which is 
important for demonstrating compliance with 
standards and ensuring public confidence 
in the water supply. Operational monitoring, 
however, reduces reliance on monitoring by 
taking samples at the end of the process and 
focusing on ensuring the efficacy of treatment 
and management processes in day-to-day 
operations.
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Box 4. Examples of operational monitoring
Operational monitoring conducted by water suppliers assesses the performance of control measures 
at appropriate time intervals. It usually is carried out through simple observations and water-quality 
tests to confirm rapidly that control measures are continuing to work. Examples include:
• turbidity and rainfall in source waters to track possible contamination events; 
• dosage of chemicals used in treatment, such as coagulants;
• turbidity measured post-filtration, preferably on each filter; 
• head pressure loss on filters to determine when the filter requires maintenance, such as 
back-washing;
• chlorine residual measured after chlorination and at critical points throughout the distribution 
system, including in dead-end sections and low-flow zones;
• temperature in warm- and cold-water plumbing systems in buildings as an integral part of 
preventing and controlling Legionella growth; and 
• inspection of protective infrastructures, such as wellheads, fences or service reservoirs.
Continuous (online) monitoring of critical water-quality parameters, such as turbidity and residual 
chlorine, can be an important part of ensuring that the barriers are optimized at all times. WHO 
has issued a technical brief that provides practical information for surveillance agencies and water 
suppliers on the significance of turbidity in source water and drinking-water and the implications of 
turbidity for water safety at each step of the water-supply chain (WHO, 2017b). 
Risk-assessment tools and sanitary 
inspections support surveillance
Robust, low-cost and easy-to-use risk-
assessment tools will aid the identification 
of locally relevant risks and support WSP 
development, particularly for small systems. 
These tools can take the form of predefined risk 
inventories (see Case study 2 from England and 
Wales). Sanitary inspection is another example 
of an easy-to-use tool that can be applied by 
operators to support WSP implementation 
and by public/environmental health officers as 
part of their independent surveillance. Sanitary 
inspection aids on-site fact-finding, particularly 
in identifying sources of the most important 
hazards, the potential for hazardous events and 
pathways of contamination from catchment to 
consumer (Box 5). The approach for pathogens 
in particular allows control options to be 
identified to prevent or minimize contamination 
of the supply. Surveillance agencies readily can 
assess whether these control options are being 
maintained. The approach can also be applied 
more broadly to inform regional or national 
priorities for improving small and larger 
supplies (see Case study 6 from Serbia).
Combined analysis of sanitary inspection 
and microbiological water-quality data is 
a powerful tool for identifying the most 
important causes of contamination and 
necessary improvement interventions (WHO, 
2017a). Risk-priority matrices (see Case study 6 
from Serbia) provide a simple grading system 
that is particularly useful in small supplies 
where the frequency of testing is low and 
reliance on analytical results alone is especially 
inappropriate. Risk-priority matrices can assist 
surveillance authorities in effective and rational 
decision-making, specifically in drawing up 
a list of required priority interventions to 
improve sanitary conditions and water quality 
and in estimating investment requirements. 
They can also help to guide public health 
authorities to establish surveillance priorities 
by identifying systems that require increased 
attention and guidance.
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Case study 9
Development of an inspectorate guideline for 
microbial risk assessment in the Netherlands
The Drinking Water Act (2011) in the Netherlands prescribes that Escherichia coli and 
enterococci must be absent in 100 ml of drinking-water and that the risk of infection for 
selected index pathogens due to the consumption of unboiled drinking-water should not 
exceed 10 000 individuals per year. Inspectorate Guideline 5318 (2005) was developed to 
support implementation of these requirements. It describes the procedures for drinking-
water suppliers on conducting a quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) for drinking-
water, which is produced from surface water. 
The main guideline provisions entail a requirement for undertaking a QMRA every fourth year 
for so-called index pathogens (enterovirus, Cryptosporidium, Giardia and Campylobacter). 
The guideline also defines monitoring frequencies for source waters that depend on volume 
of drinking-water produced. In addition to regular monitoring, a number of incidental samples 
must be collected at times when peak concentrations in pathogens are assumed to occur, 
such as times of heavy rainfall.
The guideline also describes measurements to validate treatment efficiencies for the four 
index pathogens based on indicator-organism removal rates. Based on the concentration 
of index pathogens in the source water and the reduction expected during treatment, the 
pathogen concentration in drinking-water can be estimated. This information is required to 
conduct the QMRA, the procedure for which is also described in the guideline. 
Box 5. Sanitary inspections
Volume 3 of the WHO guidelines for drinking-water quality (WHO, 1997) describes sanitary inspections as: 
On-site inspection and evaluation by qualified individuals of all conditions, devices, and 
practices in the water-supply system that pose an actual or potential danger to the health 
and well-being of the consumer. It is a fact-finding activity that should identify system 
deficiencies – not only sources of actual contamination but also inadequacies and lack of 
integrity in the system that could lead to contamination.
Sanitary inspection has many advantages. It is low-cost, requires no elaborate equipment and may 
easily be performed regularly. It can reveal conditions or practices that may cause isolated pollution 
incidents or longer-term pollution and the most obvious possible sources of contamination, but may 
not reveal all sources of contamination (such as remote contamination of groundwater). The specific 
functions of sanitary inspections include:
• enhancing knowledge of the water-supply system;
• identifying potential sources and points of contamination of the water supply that may be missed 
by water-quality analysis alone;
• quantifying the hazards attributable to the sources and supply;
• providing a clear means of explaining the hazards and related hazardous events and conditions to 
the operator and/or water user;
• providing clear guidance on remedial action required to protect and improve the supply; and
• providing raw data for use in systematic strategic planning for improvement.
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Case study 9 contd
To standardize the QMRA process performed by different drinking-water companies, a 
computational tool, QMRAspot, has been developed by the National Institute for Public Health 
and the Environment to calculate infectious risks for the consumption of drinking-water
produced from surface water. QMRAspot does not require that the user has extensive 
knowledge of QMRA, as it provides guidance on type and format of raw data, performs 
mathematical analysis on the raw data and then estimates the annual infectious risk for 
drinking-water consumption.
The insights gained from application of the guidelines and use of QMRA methods help with 
systematic assessment of the safety and robustness of a drinking-water production plant and 
support drinking-water suppliers and policy-makers in evaluating and prioritizing preventive 
measures. This supports cost-effective decision-making and maintaining a balance between 
spending of public funds and health protection. 
After more than 10 years of experience in conducting QMRA for drinking-water, the working 
groups on infectious risk currently are revising the guideline, which is expected to be launched 
by the end of 2019.
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Key message 5:  
Only monitor what is necessary
Monitoring of chemicals needs to be selective. Risk-based drinking-water 
surveillance directs water-quality monitoring towards the most important, 
relevant parameters for system performance and public health protection. 
A risk-based approach to surveillance enables 
the best use of financial, technical and 
personnel resources by directing them to the 
areas where health risks can be prevented. 
This is particularly important when considering 
chemical contaminants. A key part of the 
process of establishing risk-based surveillance 
is setting appropriate national standards 
built around the principle of reflecting what 
is considered important in any particular 
country (WHO, 2018). Appropriate standards 
form the foundation for establishing risk-
based monitoring programmes for individual 
drinking-water supplies (see Key message 3). 
Setting appropriate standards 
for chemicals and establishing 
monitoring programmes 
While the WHO guidelines for drinking-water 
quality include guideline values for more than 
90 chemicals, not all chemicals will be present 
in all water supplies. It therefore is important 
to direct monitoring resources where they will 
achieve the greatest benefit in assuring public 
health and confidence in the water supply 
rather than attempting to measure a long 
list of substances that are not there. Routine 
monitoring for substances for which results are 
always negative is generally a waste of valuable 
resources (see Case study 10 from Jersey). 
The drinking-water surveillance authority will 
almost invariably have to play a major role in 
prioritizing monitoring for chemicals.
Many chemicals can potentially be present in 
water, but most will either not be present at all 
or present at concentrations well below those of 
concern. To ensure resources are used efficiently 
and cost-effectively, national standards should 
prioritize the chemical parameters that are 
of public health significance in the national 
context. It is important to reassess periodically 
the contaminants of interest and keep lists 
of contaminants up to date. This is also an 
important part of gradual improvement as 
knowledge increases and facilities improve.
New or emerging substances and groups 
of substances may be detected in water 
sources and drinking-water, often at very 
small concentrations. They include, but are not 
limited to, pharmaceuticals, microplastics and 
industrially derived micropollutants. WHO has 
carried out detailed reviews of the occurrence 
and possible risks of some of these substances 
(WHO, 2012; 2017a; 2019). Although these 
substances sometimes receive media attention 
and concern the public, the available body of 
evidence does not always indicate that they 
will have an impact on human health through 
drinking-water. In such cases, the setting 
of water-quality standards and associated 
routine monitoring requirements would not be 
appropriate. Considering new and emerging 
hazards should not detract from dealing with 
the hazards that constitute the greatest risk to 
health, but investigative monitoring of these 
substances may be appropriate under certain 
circumstances. If data confirm that they are of 
national or subnational concern, they may be 
considered for future standard-setting as part 
of gradual improvement. 
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Occasionally, chemical contaminants that 
are of interest in a small number of specific 
circumstances may be present, and it may not 
be appropriate to include them in standards. 
Likewise, some substances are encountered 
primarily as a consequence of spills that 
are not predictable. Setting standards and 
routine monitoring requirements for such 
substances is not a reliable way of protecting 
against accidents and will dilute resources. 
Recommendations for safe levels in drinking-
water for such chemicals may then be obtained 
from the WHO guidelines for drinking-water 
quality or an alternative appropriate source.
Standards should also allow for incremental 
improvement. A standard for a substance may 
become tighter over time to allow for steps 
to be taken to meet it while considering the 
resources available to enforce the standard; the 
European Union (EU) Drinking Water Directive 
of 1998, for example, set a standard of 25 µg/L 
for lead that reduced to 10 µg/L after 15 years 
(EU, 1998).
Identifying monitoring priorities
Monitoring of chemicals needs to be selective. 
One of the significant benefits of adopting 
WSPs is that knowledge of chemical hazards 
provides much of the evidence for selecting 
and prioritizing parameters and developing 
risk-based monitoring programmes for a 
specific supply (Fig. 3). To make supply-specific 
decisions concerning choice of parameters and 
frequency of monitoring, it is important that 
regulations make provision for flexibility and 
establish clear criteria for decisions to be made, 
including a requirement for proper justification 
and documentation of the decisions taken.
The criteria for prioritizing chemical parameters 
include:
• understanding the chemicals that actually 
are present and/or are likely to occur 
(Box 6);
• information on their concentrations and 
the stability of their concentrations in 
water;
• assessment of their public health 
significance, including the likelihood 
of exceeding national standards or 
international guidelines; and 
• assessment of the likelihood of affecting 
the acceptability of the water to 
consumers.
Chemicals known to cause health effects 
through drinking-water (arsenic, fluoride, 
nitrate/nitrite and lead) should initially be 
considered for a monitoring programme or 
programme of investigation. Other substances 
may be present at concentrations close to or 
above drinking-water standards or guidelines; 
while they may not pose a direct threat to 
Box 6. Sources of chemicals in drinking-water
Chemicals in drinking-water may come from a number of sources. It is beneficial to identify and list 
substances according to the sources, such as chemicals that:
• naturally occur in source water and are released from rocks and soils and algal toxins in surface 
water;
• come from industrial activities released to source waters from manufacturing, processing and 
mining;
• come from agricultural activities reaching source waters as a result of application of manure, 
fertilizer and pesticides;
• come from human settlements resulting in source-water contamination from sewage, waste 
disposal, urban runoff and fuel leakage;
• are used in drinking-water treatment and disinfection processes; and 
• come from contact with materials during distribution, such as from storage tanks and pipes, 
including domestic plumbing (WHO, 2007). 
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health, concentrations above the standards or 
WHO guideline values will erode the margin of 
safety and, more importantly, may erode public 
confidence in the water supply. Even arsenic, 
fluoride, nitrate/nitrite and lead, however, need 
not necessarily be monitored frequently if they 
are not present at concentrations of concern, 
but are close to national standards or the WHO 
guideline values. 
Where there is reason to suspect that water-
soluble and persistent substances are present 
and can contaminate local water sources (such 
as some perfluorinated chemicals deriving from 
firefighting foams), it might be appropriate to 
carry out some investigative analysis to assess 
the risk associated with the consumption of 
contaminated drinking-water. General routine 
monitoring, however, may not be advisable, as 
analysis is complex and expensive.
The choice of parameters also needs to take 
account of specific circumstances, such as the 
use of chemical disinfectants and extraction of 
groundwater or surface water. Some substances 
rarely seen in surface water are persistent in 
groundwater when present (trichloroethene 
used in metal degreasing, for example), while 
cyanobacterial toxins will affect still and slow-
flowing surface-water sources only. Inorganic 
or organic disinfection by-products that require 
surveillance attention can be formed in supplies 
where chemical disinfectants are used in water 
treatment. While it is important to make efforts 
to keep these as low as reasonably practical, 
disinfection should never be compromised in 
trying to meet standards for these substances.
The surveillance authority should take note 
of substances that may not be of particular 
significance for health, but which adversely 
affect acceptability through taste, odour, 
discolouration or turbidity, as this may 
drive consumers to alternative supplies 
that aesthetically are more acceptable but 
microbiologically are less safe. 
Small supplies generally have fewer resources 
and limited access to trained staff. It is important 
that sampling and monitoring requirements 
for chemicals are proportionate in terms of 
the number of parameters and the frequency 
of sampling. This would include the number 
of chemicals for consideration and may be 
limited to those few that are of direct health 
concern and those that can give rise to loss 
of acceptability. The surveillance agency plays 
an important role in providing advice on the 
selection of critical parameters for monitoring. 
In the context of small supplies, risk-based 
drinking-water surveillance also plays a critical 
role in protecting the health of vulnerable 
groups (see Case study 8 from Lithuania).
Monitoring frequencies and 
sampling locations
The setting of national water-quality standards 
is closely associated with the suggested 
frequency of monitoring. Generally, the 
frequency should reflect the size of the 
population served by a water supply and the 
stability of the concentrations of chemicals in 
water. Monitoring would be infrequent, or even 
unnecessary, if concentrations are well below 
the standard and are not increasing with time. 
Where concentrations do not vary much, only 
occasional sampling, perhaps annually or even 
less frequently, would be needed, depending 
on resources. The formulation of clear criteria 
for reducing the frequency of monitoring of the 
substances that were shown not to be present, 
or even exempting those from monitoring, is an 
important part of regulations to allow for risk-
based prioritization in monitoring programming 
(see Case study 5 from Norway, Case study 11 
from the EU, Case study 12 from Hungary and 
Case study 13 from the Netherlands). 
The selection of the most appropriate sampling 
point is also an important consideration in 
setting standards that support risk-based 
surveillance. Generally, the sampling point 
depends on source and characteristics of 
the substance. If a parameter changes in 
distribution (a chlorination by-product such 
as trihalomethanes, for instance), it may be 
appropriate to take samples at the tap or at a 
remote part of the distribution system (unless 
there is a short distribution system, as is the 
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case with some small supplies). If a parameter 
(such as arsenic or fluoride) does not change 
in distribution, a single sample at the point 
immediately after treatment should be able to 
reflect concentrations at the tap over the area 
supplied. 
A different approach is required for substances 
that come from plumbing in buildings, including 
metals such as lead or copper. Concentrations 
vary significantly depending on the materials 
in contact with water, the water quality and the 
period over which the water has been in contact 
with the metals, so protocols for taking samples 
need to recognize this variation. Generally, risk-
based surveillance protocols will need to reflect 
a reasonable worst-case situation (to give the 
greatest chance of demonstrating whether 
a problem exists) to identify the presence of 
metals at elevated concentrations and the need 
for appropriate management and corrective 
action. For lead, for example, the priority 
would be to identify if lead is present and then 
determine the risk of exposure and the best 
risk-reduction strategy for the circumstances. 
Because lead concentrations in water depend 
on the contact time with the leaded material 
as well as the plumbosolvency of the water, 
routine monitoring may not be particularly 
helpful.
Exceedance of a national standard 
or international guideline value
Exceedance of the water-quality standard or 
guideline value for a chemical contaminant 
does not necessarily mean there is a threat 
to health. The risk to health will depend on 
the extent to which the standard is exceeded 
and for how long, and on the sensitivities 
of specific user groups. An example is 
methaemoglobinaemia, which can be caused 
in bottle-fed infants by nitrate/nitrite. The risk 
is increased by the presence of pathogens 
that can cause diarrhoea and organisms that 
can reduce nitrate to nitrite. Another example 
is lead, which can adversely affect learning 
in children. The problems arising from lead 
plumbing and solder can be managed in 
various ways, including ensuring that plumbing 
to drinking-water points in buildings used to a 
significant extent by children are lead-free. 
Most guideline values for chemicals have a 
large margin of safety and are intended for 
long-term, potentially lifetime, exposure. This 
means that short-term exceedances of the 
guideline or standard value do not normally 
represent a discernible increase in risk to the 
health of consumers. WHO (2018) provides 
guidance on how to determine whether the risk 
of a chemical exceeding the standard is serious 
or not.
If the exposure is relatively minor and short-
term, the key is to determine why it happened 
and see whether it is likely to occur repeatedly. If 
so, it is appropriate to put in place improvements 
to the way the hazard is managed as part of the 
WSP. If this is not possible, it may be appropriate 
to allow a derogation from the standard. It is 
important, however, that the derogation is 
conditional and a plan to reassess the situation 
at intervals is in place. The surveillance agency 
will be responsible for deciding whether urgent 
action is needed or not and establishing a 
concentration that is above the standard, but 
which should not be exceeded (see Case study 4 
from Portugal). The WHO guidelines for 
drinking-water quality (WHO, 2017a) contain 
additional advice on chemicals and what to do 
in cases of exceedance of the guideline value.
Further guidance on the identification of 
monitoring priorities, monitoring frequencies 
and sampling locations, and on exceedances of 
national standards, is provided by WHO (2017a; 
2018).
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Case study 10
Risk-based monitoring of chemical parameters 
in Jersey
Jersey primarily uses surface water, as groundwater sources on the island are very limited 
and there is a fluctuating population with increases during the summer holiday months when 
tourist numbers rise. The island has limited heavy or manufacturing industry but an extensive 
agriculture sector, including dairy-based farming and a significant distinctive early potato-
growing industry. The problems of source-water contamination relate to microbiological 
contamination from agriculture and septic tanks, and chemical contamination with nitrate 
and a range of pesticides. 
Most of the results of extensive chemical monitoring in drinking-water to meet the 
requirements of the drinking-water regulations of the United Kingdom, adopted in Jersey 
law, resulted in non-detects or very low levels of chemicals, but the cost of monitoring was 
significant. A risk-based approach to monitoring was introduced, which reduced the number 
of determinations and the cost of carrying out drinking-water compliance monitoring by 
over 50%. 
The problem of raw water contamination with pesticides remained, however. The reduction 
in cost of the monitoring programme released funds to increase the monitoring of raw water, 
which allowed better quality management by changing the streams from which water was 
abstracted into reservoirs and identification and management of historic contamination by 
pesticides that were no longer used. The data were also pivotal in persuading the agricultural 
industry to adopt better catchment practices to prevent or minimize contamination.
 
Case study 11
Incorporation of risk-based monitoring 
provisions in the EU Drinking Water Directive
The Commission Directive 2015/1787 of 6 October 2015 amended Annexes II and III of the 
EU Drinking Water Directive 98/83/EC (EU, 2015). Annex II lays down the requirement 
for drinking-water quality-monitoring, including parameters to be monitored, monitoring 
frequency and the point of sampling. The amendment replaced the previous rigid monitoring 
scheme and allows the competent (surveillance) authorities to establish a more flexible, risk-
based monitoring programme that offers the potential to derogate from the default list of 
parameters and minimum sampling frequencies for compliance monitoring, provided a risk 
assessment is performed. The monitoring programmes do not rely solely on compliance 
monitoring but may also include elements of operational monitoring and sanitary inspections 
(Fig. CS2).
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Case study 11 contd
Fig. CS2. Elements of monitoring programmes under Annex II of the EU Drinking Water Directive
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While the minimum frequency of sampling for Escherichia coli must not be reduced under 
any circumstances, the frequency of other parameters may be reduced provided the results 
obtained from points representative of the whole water-supply system have been less 
than 60% of the parametric value for at least three years and the concentration has been 
reasonably stable (no increasing trend). A parameter may be removed from the list if the 
results obtained have been less than 30%. 
The precondition and rationale for granting derogations from the parameters and frequencies 
is a risk assessment. This should consider the local conditions for a particular water supply, 
informed by the results of source-water monitoring and confirming that no factor that can 
reasonably be anticipated is likely to cause deterioration of the quality of the water. The risk 
assessment should be based on the general principles set out in relation to international 
standards, which include the WHO guidelines for drinking-water quality. Risk assessments 
must be approved by the relevant competent (surveillance) authority and a summary of the 
results must be made available.
 
Case study 12
The Hungarian monitoring exemption system 
for chemical parameters
Hungary has adopted the possibility of derogating from the drinking-water monitoring 
scheme introduced by the Commission Directive 2015/1787 of 6 October 2015 amending 
Annexes II and III to Council Directive 98/83/EC on the quality of water intended for human 
consumption (see Case study 11 from the EU). 
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Case study 12 contd
Drinking-water suppliers can apply for exemption from monitoring certain parameters if they 
can confirm that they are not present in their water supply. The following criteria apply:
• the drinking-water source should be a protected groundwater source, confirmed by 
tritium measurement; and
• the results of the last three analyses were not higher than the limit of quantification (as 
defined in the legislation) or 30 % of the parametric value; and 
• the water supply’s WSP should justify that pollution cannot reasonably be expected. 
If the criteria are met, the exemption is granted by the chief medical officer of the state. 
The range of parameters is limited to pollutants related to the source water but covers both 
naturally occurring (such as arsenic, boron or selenium) and anthropogenic (pesticides, for 
example) substances. Drinking-water suppliers still have to measure every parameter once 
every three years, but if the result remains negative, the derogation will be granted further. 
This scheme allows monitoring efforts to be focused on relevant parameters.
 
Case study 13
Development of an inspectorate guideline for 
risk-based monitoring in the Netherlands
To ensure good quality of drinking-water, the Drinking Water Act (2011) in the Netherlands 
requires a pre-set list of parameters and sampling frequencies to be measured. The Commission 
Directive 2015/1787 amended Annexes II and III of the Drinking Water Directive 98/83/EC 
and introduced the possibility of following a risk-based approach for designing water-quality 
monitoring programmes, which was adopted by the Netherlands (see Case study 11 from the 
EU). 
A national guideline is being developed to support uptake of the risk-based monitoring 
approach. The objectives of the guideline will be to provide a uniform format for establishing 
supply-specific risk assessments and instituting monitoring programmes for drinking-water 
companies, and define procedures for the process of approval, thereby ensuring a uniform 
level of protection for all citizens. Special attention will be given to anthropogenic substances, 
for which a separate strategy has been developed.
The working group on risk-based monitoring consisted of organizations that included drinking-
water service providers and laboratories, the National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment and the KWR Water Research Institute. The Human Environment and Transport 
Inspectorate and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management were also involved. 
In accordance with the WSP approach, the guideline will stipulate seven steps that drinking-
water service providers shall follow. They include undertaking a risk assessment for every 
aspect of the water-supply system, including consideration of the vulnerability of source water, 
presence of contaminant sources in the catchment area, formation of contaminants during 
drinking-water treatment and the trend in concentrations over recent years. 
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Case study 13 contd
Based on the risk assessment, water suppliers propose a list of parameters to be monitored 
alongside their testing frequencies. Screening methods and effect-directed analysis (such 
as non-target analysis, biomonitoring and bioassays) and online monitoring procedures can 
also be part of the monitoring programme. The guideline will define clear criteria that can be 
used to justify the suggested monitoring frequencies; these will align fully with the provisions 
of the Commission Directive 2015/1787.
The suggested monitoring programme will need to be approved by the Human Environment 
and Transport Inspectorate. Drinking-water companies will need to evaluate and possibly 
revise the risk assessment and the corresponding monitoring programme every year. The risk 
assessment and the monitoring programme will need to be documented.
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Key message 6:  
Risk-based surveillance aids 
forward-thinking and anticipation 
of change 
Hazards and risks change over time. Surveillance agencies have an important 
supporting role in predicting, identifying and tracking long-term changes and 
associated risks for drinking-water supply.
Drinking-water supply systems potentially are 
vulnerable to the impacts of long-term changes 
that can affect drinking-water quantity and 
quality. Planning for adaptation to climate, 
environmental and other human-made change 
and building resilient water supplies requires the 
cooperation of a number of stakeholders at local 
and national levels; surveillance agencies have 
an important role to play in supporting these 
processes. A risk-based approach supports 
forecasting of, and adaptation to, changing 
external circumstances. 
Changes in circumstances and their 
implications
Climate change is an example of a change in 
circumstance. It may result in shifting patterns 
of hydrological conditions and extreme events, 
including increased drought, temperatures, 
heavy rainfall, flooding and sea-level rises (WHO, 
2017c). It may be difficult to predict the nature 
and extent of change in the local water-supply 
context, but impacts that add pressures on water 
systems can be expected. Changing patterns of 
hydrology and weather can alter the presence of 
hazards, and the significance of risks from those 
hazards, in the drinking-water catchment area 
and throughout the water-supply chain. These 
changes can affect both the quantity and quality 
of water resources available for drinking-water 
supply and also lead to significant disruption to 
water operations. Examples of climate change 
impacts are shown in Table 1. 
Other pressures on water availability and 
drinking-water service provision are due in many 
areas to increased demand from urbanization, 
irrigated agriculture, tourism and industry, 
with the biggest problems often arising from 
combinations of these developments. While 
increased demand for water can result in 
exploitation of resources and issues related to 
the allocation of resources for drinking-water 
production, it can also lead to changes to the 
hazards presented and their associated risks. For 
example, over-abstraction of groundwater can 
result in the oxidation of strata in the aquifer and 
the release of naturally occurring contaminants, 
some of which are of concern to health. Extended 
dry periods increase this pressure and can also 
result in cracking of the surface layers, allowing 
easy transference of contamination from the 
surface to groundwater when rainfall arrives, 
often concentrated in a shorter period of heavier 
rain. Urbanization can lead not only to increased 
demand, but also to more sealed surfaces, which 
results in heavy rainfall causing overflows of 
drainage and sewer systems. Pressure on existing 
water resources can mean that new and possibly 
lower-quality sources will need to be considered. 
Such steps need careful planning to ensure that 
public health is not adversely affected.
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Table 1. Examples of climate change impacts on drinking-water supply 
Event Potential impacts
Increased 
temperatures
• Increased formation of cyanobacterial blooms in freshwater
• Increased risk of wildfires degrading water quality in moorland and forested 
and peaty catchments
• Proliferation of opportunist pathogens (such as Legionella) and 
heterotrophic bacteria within water-storage and distribution systems
• Reduced stability of chlorine residual in distribution
• Increased formation of some disinfection by-products
• Higher water demand
Drought • Increased competition for scarce water resources, potentially leading to 
lower water availability
• Reduced groundwater tables causing wells to dry up, increasing travel 
distances to collect water
• Decreased dilution in source waters and increased concentration of 
pollutants and nutrients
• Release of contaminants from reservoir sediments into water body, such as 
benthic nutrients and metals
Sea-level rise • Increased saline ingress of coastal aquifers
• Intrusion of seawater into distribution networks
• Inundation of water-supply infrastructures
Precipitation 
and flooding
• Flood damage to water and sanitation infrastructure
• Overwhelmed containment systems discharging untreated storm- and 
wastewater into source waters
• Heavier rainfall events and storm runoff causing increased loading of 
pathogens and suspended sediment in surface waters
• Overwhelmed drinking-water treatment systems becoming less effective
Sources: WHO (2017c); WHO Regional Office for Europe (2011).
Long-term changes in land use and human 
activity in drinking-water catchments are 
important considerations. The expansion of 
urban areas and industrial activity, alterations in 
the pattern and timing of crops in agriculture, 
intensification of animal husbandry or the 
increased reuse of wastewater can all induce 
changes in the use or release of (emerging) 
chemicals in the catchment environment, 
introduce new sources and pathways for 
microbiological contamination of water 
resources and/or alter water-use patterns.
What does risk-based surveillance 
add?
Those responsible for drinking-water safety, 
including surveillance agencies, need to 
have a good understanding of how climate, 
environmental and socioeconomic change 
are affecting, and are likely to affect, water 
resources and therefore drinking-water supply 
systems. This will inform changes to policies, 
programmes and infrastructure to prepare for, 
and cope with, changing freshwater quantity 
and quality (WHO, 2017a). They also need to 
understand how changing demand through 
urbanization, agriculture, tourism and industry 
is likely to occur and impact on water supply.
Adaptive risk management will require 
long-term planning, as required policy and 
infrastructure changes will take time to 
formulate and put in place. Mitigation measures 
can range from flood protection through 
increased capacities of water treatment to 
regulating land use in the catchment area. Such 
planning is an important step in preventing 
problems, or at least mitigating the effects if 
they cannot completely be prevented. 
Risk-based surveillance has an important 
supporting role in predicting, identifying and 
tracking long-term changes and associated 
risks for drinking-water supply. Surveillance 
agencies are in a good position to promote 
collaboration with other sectors and, in concert 
with other relevant agencies, provide essential 
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information to aid strategic and operational 
decision-making and planning at national and 
local levels for improved water-supply system 
resilience and preparedness. They can also 
advise water suppliers on taking appropriate 
adaptation steps.
In the context of responding to long-term 
change, the supporting role of surveillance 
agencies may include: 
• advocating and proactively participating 
in long-term planning processes to ensure 
continuing access to freshwater sources 
for drinking-water purposes, manage 
water demand among competing needs, 
review the resilience of supply systems 
and implement control measures to 
maintain water quality;
• promoting consideration of the hazards 
and health risks resulting from long-
term changes in the local WSPs of water 
suppliers (specific guidance on developing 
climate-resilient WSPs and managing and 
adapting to extreme weather events is 
provided by WHO (WHO, 2017c; WHO 
Regional Office for Europe, 2011);
• engaging with other sectors and 
agencies (including environment, water 
resource management, meteorology and 
agriculture) and supporting collation 
and analysis of data over time to identify 
possible new hazards, trends and peaks in 
concentrations, and inform water suppliers 
accordingly (other sectors may already 
have data available that the water-supply 
sector can access); and 
• advising policy-makers and regulators if 
regulations and water-quality standards 
merit updates in response to observed 
changes in terms of, for example, additional 
parameters or parametric values. 
Prioritizing the development of risk-based 
surveillance programmes is likely to be a critical 
component in promoting more effective and 
resilient water supplies, not least because it 
changes the mindset of surveillance agencies, 
water suppliers and communities towards 
looking forwards.
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The framework for safe drinking-water recommended by the WHO guidelines for drinking-
water quality promotes a risk-based preventive management approach to ensure safety of 
drinking-water. Independent drinking-water surveillance is one of the core components of 
this framework and is an essential public health function. 
To be effective, drinking-water surveillance needs to be aligned with risk-based principles, 
including prioritization of monitoring parameters and surveillance efforts based on water 
safety plan outcomes. Applying a risk-based approach in drinking-water surveillance helps 
countries to focus on the issues that are most important for the protection of public health 
and so maximizes the benefits that can accrue from limited resources.
The Protocol on Water and Health promotes establishing and maintaining a legal and 
institutional framework for monitoring and enforcing standards for the quality of drinking-
water. Supporting countries in building effective systems for surveillance of drinking-water is 
therefore a priority area of work under the Protocol.
This publication provides a rationale for decision-makers, regulators and professionals in the 
fields of public health, environment and water management to promote and support uptake 
of risk-based approaches in regulations and surveillance practice. It has been designed 
around six key messages that underlie the concept of risk-based approaches in drinking-
water surveillance and is supported by practical examples for illustration purposes.
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